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Abstract
We respond more quickly to our own face than to other faces, but there is debate over whether this is connected to
attention-grabbing properties of the self-face. In two experiments, we investigate whether the self-face selectively captures
attention, and the attentional conditions under which this might occur. In both experiments, we examined whether
different types of face (self, friend, stranger) provide differential levels of distraction when processing self, friend and
stranger names. In Experiment 1, an image of a distractor face appeared centrally – inside the focus of attention – behind a
target name, with the faces either upright or inverted. In Experiment 2, distractor faces appeared peripherally – outside the
focus of attention – in the left or right visual field, or bilaterally. In both experiments, self-name recognition was faster than
other name recognition, suggesting a self-referential processing advantage. The presence of the self-face did not cause
more distraction in the naming task compared to other types of face, either when presented inside (Experiment 1) or
outside (Experiment 2) the focus of attention. Distractor faces had different effects across the two experiments: when
presented inside the focus of attention (Experiment 1), self and friend images facilitated self and friend naming, respectively.
This was not true for stranger stimuli, suggesting that faces must be robustly represented to facilitate name recognition.
When presented outside the focus of attention (Experiment 2), no facilitation occurred. Instead, we report an interesting
distraction effect caused by friend faces when processing strangers’ names. We interpret this as a ‘‘social importance’’ effect,
whereby we may be tuned to pick out and pay attention to familiar friend faces in a crowd. We conclude that any speed of
processing advantages observed in the self-face processing literature are not driven by automatic attention capture.
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Introduction
We respond more quickly to our own face than to others [1–3],
but we are unsure of the mechanism underlying this advantage.
One sensible suggestion is that the self-face automatically captures
our attention, speeding our reaction to it. However, research
investigating whether our own face does selectively grab our
attention has produced mixed findings, and studies have suffered
from a lack of rigorous control in focus of attention. Here, we
report two experiments investigating whether the self-face does
indeed selectively capture our attention, and the attentional
conditions under which this might be possible.
One of the key questions in attention research revolves around
how much information we process from stimuli that we are not
directly attending to, and the circumstances in which these
unattended stimuli can capture our attention (cf. the Cocktail
Party phenomenon; [4,5]). One common way to investigate this
question is to present task-irrelevant stimuli and measure their
effect on task performance (cf. The Stroop effect; [6]). We can
further investigate the phenomenon by measuring the effect of
presenting task-irrelevant stimuli both inside and outside the focus
of attention, enabling us to define the circumstances in which
different classes of task-irrelevant stimuli selectively capture our
attention.
Self-name and attention capture
The idea that self-referential stimuli can selectively capture our
attention has largely been studied using the self-name. Several
studies show that our own name is processed preferentially, but
only when it is task-relevant; our own name does not selectively
capture attention when it is irrelevant to the task at hand [7,8].
Conversely, others show that the self-name does have selective
attention-capture capacity, even when task-irrelevant: it is more
resistant to the attentional blink, inattentional blindness and
repetition blindness than other names and words [9–11]. Key to
understanding the circumstances in which our own name does
automatically capture our attention are studies manipulating the
focus of attention.
In an important paper, Gronau and colleagues look at the
effects that personally relevant stimuli – self-names – have when
presented both inside and outside the focus of attention [12].
Participants were instructed to report the colour of a piece of text,
but to ignore the distractor names represented by the text,
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presented centrally (at the focus of attention; Stroop-like task) or to
report the colour of a box presented centrally with distractor
names presented peripherally (outside the focus of attention).
When presented centrally, the self-name caused significantly more
interference on the colour-naming task than other names.
However, this effect disappeared when the names were presented
peripherally above or below a coloured box, outside the focus of
attention. Interestingly, skin conductance responses – taken as a
sign of processing a stimulus of personal significance [13] –
remained larger for self-names compared to other names for both
central and peripheral presentation of the names, suggesting that
the peripherally presented stimuli were being processed. It seems
that the capacity of our own name to automatically capture our
attention exists in a complicated relationship with the focus of
attention.
Focus of attention – self-face
Self-referential stimuli may capture attention automatically, but
to investigate whether this is due to a truly self-referential effect,
Devue and Bre´dart [14] recommend using self-face stimuli rather
than self-name stimuli, as the self-face is unique to each person.
Indeed, early evidence suggested that the self-face is more easily
detected than recently learned faces [1], but that study suffered
from the absence of a familiarity control. There are many reasons
to believe that our own face is processed as ‘‘special’’, with
evidence of speeded processing [1–3], a widely distributed
underlying neural network [15–20] and a stronger feature-based
processing approach relative to other faces [3,21–23]. Our own
face provides a truly unique stimulus, which appears to receive
special treatment in the brain. Considering this special treatment,
the self-face is a likely candidate to elicit automatic attention
capture. Indeed, there is some evidence of automatic processing of
the self-face [24], which in turn might indicate an automatic
attention capture mechanism. However, although we may pay
particular attention to our own face, it is unclear whether the self-
face selectively grabs our attention, or whether it simply holds our
attention once attended to (see [25]).
Research on whether our own face automatically captures our
attention has produced conflicting results. Bre´dart and Devue [26]
conducted one of the first studies looking at the self-face and
attention capture. They showed that our own face causes more
distraction than other familiar faces when presented peripherally –
ostensibly outside of the focus of attention. The authors presented
participants with a pair of vertically aligned word stimuli,
presented centrally on a screen. Each word pair comprised a
name (either the participant’s own name or the name of a familiar
classmate) and a letter string. The participant’s task was to indicate
whose name was present. Flanking these word pairs either to the
left or the right, a distractor picture appeared which showed the
participant’s own face, the face of their classmate or the face of
their professor. The authors report that the peripheral presenta-
tion of the self-face caused more distraction when identifying a
classmate’s name than a classmate’s face caused when identifying
the participant’s own name, suggesting that the self-face automat-
ically and selectively captured attention, even when presented
outside the focus of attention.
A later paper presented conflicting results. Devue and Bre´dart
[14] showed that the self-face and other highly familiar faces
produce a temporary distraction when presented inside the focus
of attention (between two target digits), suggesting that these types
of face can automatically capture attention. However, these faces
did not produce a distraction when presented outside the focus of
attention. Importantly, the faces presented peripherally were
presented only briefly (200 ms), unlike the faces in the earlier study
[26], where the stimuli were displayed until the participant
responded. Where the stimuli were presented indefinitely, the
participant may have had time to shift attention directly towards
the distractor faces, bringing them inside the focus of attention.
When this factor was adjusted in the later paper [14], self-faces
presented peripherally did not selectively capture attention.
Further research showed that highly familiar faces (including the
self-face) did not reduce inattentional blindness relative to
unfamiliar faces, even when presented inside the focus of attention
[27]. There remains debate as to whether our own face does
selectively capture our attention [26] or whether the self-face is as
easily ignored as other familiar [14] and unfamiliar [27] faces.
While various methodologies have been employed to investigate
this phenomenon, insufficient focus of attention controls may
account for many of the reported discrepancies.
Current Study
The current paper addresses previous issues concerning focus of
attention in two ways. First, we use a face-word paradigm to
present distractor faces directly central to the focus of attention
(Experiment 1) and secondly we employ a rigorously controlled
hemispheric asymmetry paradigm to examine the effects of
distractor faces presented outside the focus of attention (Experi-
ment 2). No studies to date have presented distractor faces
centrally behind target names to test the attention capture capacity
of face identity on a naming task, and this experiment presents a
novel approach to the problem of controlling the focus of
attention.
Aims Experiment 1
In Experiment 1, we test whether different types of face cause
differential levels of distraction when processing one’s own name, a
friend’s name and a stranger’s name, when presented inside the
focus of attention. Of additional interest are the properties of a
face which are responsible for capturing attention. Highly familiar
faces may capture attention because they are ‘‘robustly represent-
ed’’ in the brain [1]. These robust representations are likely to rely
heavily on configural information [28]. Recent evidence [3]
suggests that self-faces may be processed in a qualitatively different
way than other highly familiar faces, activating strong configural
and featural processing. Specifically, while familiar face processing
is detrimentally affected by inversion, which disrupts configural
processing [29–31], processing speed advantages remain for self-
faces when inverted. As such, the comparison of self-faces and
other highly familiar faces in an attention capture task which
includes upright and inverted faces should tell us much about the
relative input of facial configural and featural information which
are particularly implicated in attention capture.
If attention-capturing capacity is based largely on configural
processing, then differences observed between upright friend and
unfamiliar faces should disappear for inverted faces, because
configural processing suffers with inversion. For self-faces, any
attention-capturing capacity should remain for inverted faces, as
we are particularly good at processing the self-face relative to other
types of face when configural information is disrupted [3,23].
Alternatively, if the attention-capturing capacity of familiar faces
(self, friend) is based on another mechanism, inversion should have
the same effect on friend and self-faces.
Aims Experiment 2
In Experiment 2 we investigate how different types of face can
attract attention when presented outside of the focus of attention
(peripherally). There are a number of reasons why we are
particularly interested in following up on previous reports of
The Self-Face Does Not Automatically Capture Attention
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peripheral self-face attention capture. Firstly, differences in
stimulus duration could account for discrepancies in accounts of
peripheral self-face attention capture. Stimulus duration control is
of importance here; a long stimulus duration potentially allows
time for the participant to explicitly shift attention from the name
to the face picture, which would elicit a shift in the locus of
attention. In this experiment, we employ several measures to
rigorously control focus of attention – peripheral stimuli are
presented briefly enough to prevent an explicit shift of the focus of
attention and a chin rest and participant eye-monitoring
techniques are used to ensure that fixation does not shift towards
the peripheral stimuli.
A second area of interest involves hemispheric presentation. A
previous report of peripheral self-face attention capture found that
the presentation location of the distractor face (to the left or right
of the target stimulus) did not produce an effect [26]. Considering
issues of hemispheric asymmetry in face processing in general (e.g.,
[32]) and self-face processing in particular (e.g., [16,18]), this is
surprising. In the current study, we manipulate hemispheric
presentation in a tightly controlled manner. If the attention-
grabbing capacity of faces is modulated by visual field presenta-
tion, we might expect them to produce more attentional
interference when presented in the left visual field (right
hemisphere; RH) relative to the right (left hemisphere; LH), as
faces are processed preferentially in the RH (e.g., [33]). In
addition, considering that self-face processing may activate a more
bilateral neural network that other familiar faces [3,15–20], LH
interference may be increased for self-face relative to other face
distractor trials.
Experiment 1
Method
Participants. Forty participants (24 female) with a mean age
of 26.5 years (SD = 7.8) volunteered to take part in the study. Each
participant was paired with a highly familiar same-sex friend
whom they had known for at least one year, and whom they saw
on a daily or almost daily basis. The majority of the participants
were recruited in pairs, where each person served as a friend for
the other participant. Data from six participants were discarded
due to data coding errors (two participants) or participant error in
understanding the instructions (four participants). The remaining
34 participants (21 female) had a mean age of 26.2 years
(SD = 8.1).
Ethics Statement. Written informed consent was obtained
from all participants prior to taking part in the study. The consent
procedure and all other elements of both experiments detailed in
this manuscript received full ethical approval from the Faculty
Research Ethics Panel (Science and Technology) at Anglia Ruskin
University. The approval number for both experiments is FST/
FREP/11/17. The individuals pictured in the figures of this
manuscript have given written informed consent (as outlined in
PLOS consent form) to publish their images.
Stimuli. Participants were photographed in similar conditions
under controlled lighting. Participants posed with a neutral
expression while looking directly at the camera (Nikon D300).
Using Adobe Photoshop, images were converted to greyscale and
rotated to ensure that the eyes were collinear. An oval vignette
(2456320 pixels) was applied to each facial image, ensuring that
the jawline and hairline of each face were visible. Images were
saved as normal and mirror-reversed copies. The mirror reversed
copies of the images served as the ‘‘self’’ stimuli for participants,
while the ‘‘friend’’ and ‘‘unfamiliar’’ stimuli were viewed normally
(see 34 for evidence that these are the preferred views of self-faces
and other familiar faces). Images were saved in both upright and
inverted orientations.
Each participant’s set of stimuli comprised images of their own
face, a friend’s face and a stranger’s face overlaid with a name.
This name was their own name, their friend’s name or the
stranger’s name. The name was placed centrally in an identical
position across each facial image (centre of name at 160 pixels
from bottom of image). Where an image of a face was presented in
an inverted orientation, the text of the name was presented in
upright orientation. Images were checked to ensure that the eyes
and mouth were not obscured by text in any of the images (see
Figure 1; the individual pictured here has given written informed
consent for the use of this image). Images were viewed on a 17 inch
screen of a Dell PC. Images subtended a viewing angle of 5.32 by
6.95 degrees when viewed from a distance of approximately
70 cm.
Procedure. Prior to testing, participants were shown upright
versions of all three images (self [mirror-reversed], friend and
stranger) without any text across the faces. The names identifying
the faces were written on the screen below. Participants were asked
to look at the faces for as long as it took for them to be confidently
able to name each of the three faces. This was to ensure that
participants were able to label the unfamiliar face with a name.
This process took between 30–100 s for all participants.
Participants ran ten practice trials followed by a block of test
trials. A trial comprised the presentation of a face (self, friend,
unfamiliar) in either upright or inverted orientation with a name
written across it (participant’s own name, friend’s name or
stranger’s name). Participants were required to press a button on
the keyboard (‘‘c’’, ‘‘v’’ or ‘‘b’’) to indicate whether the name
presented was their own name, their friend’s name or the
stranger’s name. The order of the buttons allocated to ‘‘self’’,
Figure 1. Example of an upright stimulus from Experiment 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110792.g001
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‘‘friend’’ and ‘‘stranger’’ was counterbalanced across participants.
Stimuli were left on the screen until the participant responded.
Each trial was followed by an inter-stimulus interval (ISI) varying
between 500 and 1500 ms. Participants were instructed not to
attend to the faces, and to respond as quickly and as accurately as
possible.
Trials were balanced such that each face type (self, friend,
stranger) was paired with each name type (self, friend, stranger)
and equal number of times, and these pairings were presented with
faces in upright and inverted orientations an equal number of
times. Trials were presented in randomised order. The testing
block comprised 216 trials (3 face types X 3 name types X 2 face
orientations X 12 repetitions each).
Results
Reaction times (RT) for correct responses were analysed.
Incorrect responses accounted for 5.2% of the data, and were
removed. For each participant, RT’s more than two standard
deviations away from that participant’s mean were removed as
outliers [35]; these accounted for 10.3% of trials. Data can be
found at http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.942382 [36].
A 3-way repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out, with
factors of Distractor Face (self, friend, stranger), Target Name (self,
friend, stranger) and Orientation (upright, inverted), and with RT
to correct responses serving as the dependent variable. All post-hoc
tests were interpreted using Bonferroni adjustment for multiple
comparisons.
Analysis revealed a significant effect of Target Name,
F(2,66) = 10.44, p,.001, gp
2 = .240, with a priori follow-up tests
showing participants responding significantly faster to their own
name than to a friend’s name, t(33) = 4.86, p,.05, d= .380, or a
stranger’s name, t(33) = 2.56, p,.05, d= .260. RT in response to
friend and stranger names did not differ, t(33) = 1.70, ns, d= .128
(see Figure 2).
There was no main effect of Distractor Face, F(2,66) = 0.69, ns.,
gp
2 = .011, but this null effect is qualified by a significant
interaction between Distractor Face and Target Name,
F(4,132) = 6.84, p,.001, gp
2 = .172. Follow-up tests show that
when responding to a friend’s name, responses were significantly
faster when the name was accompanied by the friend’s face
(Target Name-Distractor Face congruence) relative to the self-face,
t(33) = 2.69, p,.017, d= .171, or a stranger’s face, t(33) = 3.44,
p,.017, d= .206 (Target Name-Distractor Face incongruence),
suggesting that the presence of the friend’s face facilitated friend
name processing. Responses to the friend’s name did not differ
when accompanied by the self-face compared to the stranger’s
face, t(33) = 0.55, ns, d= .042. Alpha is Bonferroni corrected to
.017 for three comparisons.
Similarly, when responding to the self-name, responses were
significantly faster when the name was accompanied by the self-
face (Target Name-Distractor Face congruence) relative to a
friend’s face, t(33) = 3.19, p,.017, d= .289, or a stranger’s face,
t(33) = 2.40, p= .022, d= .217 (closely approaching significance at
.017; Target Name-Distractor Face incongruence), suggesting that
the presence of the self-face facilitated self-name processing.
Responses to the self-name did not differ when accompanied by a
friend’s face or a stranger’s face, t(33) = 0.94, ns, d= .063. Alpha is
Bonferroni corrected to .017 for three comparisons.
When responding to the stranger’s name, no differences were
observed depending on whether the Distractor Face presented was
congruent or incongruent to the Target Name (self-face Vs
stranger face, t(33) = 2.14, ns, d= .163; friend face Vs stranger
face, t(33) = 0.70, ns, d= .058; self-face Vs friend face, t(33) = 1.61,
ns, d= .108; alpha is Bonferroni corrected to .017 for three
comparisons). Overall, congruent face-name stimuli pairings
elicited faster naming responses than incongruent pairings for
both Self and Friend pairings, but not for Stranger pairings. See
Figure 3 for illustration of these interaction effects.
Figure 2. Response times to the self-name, friend’s name and stranger’s name in Experiment 1. Mean response times to recognise the
self-name (red) a friend’s name (blue) and a stranger’s name (green) in Experiment 1.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110792.g002
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There was no effect of Orientation, F(1,33) = 2.92, ns,
gp
2 = .081, nor did Orientation interact with any of the other
variables (Orientation by Target Name by Distractor Face:
F(4,132) = 1.48, ns, gp
2 = .043; Orientation by Target Name:
F(2,66) = 1.82, ns, gp
2 = .052; Orientation by Distractor Face:
F(2,66) = 0.08, ns, gp
2 = .003).
Accuracy Analyses. As predicted with a straightforward
name-recognition task, there was a ceiling effect for accuracy, with
participants correctly identifying whether a name was their own, a
friend’s or a stranger’s at an accuracy rate of 97.56% (SD = 1.81).
Here only one minor result reached significance, with participants
being slightly less accurate when responding to a stranger’s name
in the presence of a friend’s face (96.81%, SD = 4.82) compared to
the stranger’s face (98.89%, SD = 2.13), t(33) = 3.25, p,.05.
Considering the obvious ceiling effect in the accuracy data, we
do not interpret this effect to be of importance, and do not discuss
it further.
Experiment 2
Method
Participants. Thirty-nine participants (23 female) with a
mean age of 25.5 years (SD = 6.4) volunteered to take part in the
study. Again, each participant was paired with a highly familiar
same-sex friend whom they had known for at least one year, and
whom they saw on a daily or almost daily basis. Data from one
participant were discarded due to data coding errors. The
remaining 38 participants (23 female) had a mean age of 25.7
years (SD = 6.4). All participants were right-handed, as assessed by
the Oldfield Inventory [37], with a mean laterality quotient of 87.6
(SD = 17.9). Left-handed and ambidextrous individuals were not
invited to participate because hemispheric asymmetry in face
processing was a variable of interest and the brains of right-handed
individuals are considered to be more strongly and conventionally
lateralised [38]. Full ethical approval was gained for this study,
the details of which are outlined in the Methods section of
Experiment 1.
Stimuli. Photographs of participants were collected and
edited in a similar manner to Experiment 1. After conversion to
greyscale and applying an oval vignette to each face image
(3706460 pixels), a set of stimuli were created for each participant
comprising images of their own face (mirror-reversed), a friend’s
face and a stranger’s face. These faces were presented to the left
(LVF), right (RVF) or both (bilaterally) of a centrally presented
name. This name was their own name, their friend’s name or the
stranger’s name, and was placed in an identical position (225 pixels
from the bottom of the image) for each stimulus (see Figure 4; the
individual pictured here has given written informed consent for the
use of this image). Where images of faces were presented
bilaterally, the faces were always identical. Images subtended a
viewing angle of 7.76 by 9.80, and the centre of each image was
9.32 degrees to the left or right of the centre of the screen when
viewed from a distance of 70 cm. This viewing distance was
maintained by the use of a chinrest. To ensure that the face images
were presented to each hemisphere (or both) in a controlled
manner, the researcher monitored participants’ eye movements in
real time using a webcam to check that their gaze remained on the
centre of the screen at all times.
Procedure. Participants were initially familiarised with their
three faces to be used as their stimuli along with their associated
names in a similar manner to Experiment 1.
Participants ran ten practice trials followed by two blocks of test
trials. One block of testing was completed with the right hand and
the other with the left hand; the order of these blocks was
counterbalanced across participants. A trial comprised the
presentation of a name in the centre of the screen, with the
participant’s own face, a friend’s face or a stranger’s face
appearing to the left, to the right or on both sides of the name.
The name presented was the participant’s own name, a friend’s
name or a stranger’s name. The participant’s task was to indicate
by pressing a button on the keyboard (‘‘c’’, ‘‘v’’ or ‘‘b’’) who the
name belonged to (self, friend, or stranger). The order of the
buttons allocated to ‘‘self’’, ‘‘friend’’ and ‘‘stranger’’ was counter-
balanced across participants. Each stimulus was presented on
screen for 250 ms, followed by an ISI varying between 500 and
1,500 ms. Participants were instructed not to attend to the faces,
and to respond as quickly and as accurately as possible.
Trials were balanced such that each face type (self, friend,
stranger) was paired with each name type (self, friend, stranger)
and equal number of times, and these pairings were presented with
faces in the LVF, the RVF and bilaterally an equal number of
times. Trials were presented in randomised order. Each testing
block comprised 189 trials (3 face types X 3 name types X 3 visual
field presentations X 7 repetitions each).
Results
Reaction times (RT) for correct responses were analysed.
Incorrect responses accounted for 10.6% of the data, and were
removed. For each participant, RT’s more than two standard
deviations away from that participant’s mean were removed as
Figure 3. Influence of centrally presented task-irrelevant distractor faces on speed of name recognition. Mean response times to
recognise the self-name (panel A) a friend’s name (panel B) and a stranger’s name (panel C) when the self-face (red), friend face (blue) and stranger
face (green) was presented centrally as a distractor (Experiment 1).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110792.g003
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outliers [35]; these accounted for 14.2% of trials. Data can be
found at http://dx.doi.org/10.6084/m9.figshare.942383 [39].
A 3-way repeated-measures ANOVA was carried out, with
factors of Distractor Face (self, friend, stranger), Target Name (self,
friend, stranger) and Visual Field (LVF, RVF, bilateral), and with
RT to correct responses serving as the dependent variable. All
post-hoc tests were interpreted using Bonferroni adjustment for
multiple comparisons.
Analysis revealed a significant effect of Target Name,
F(2,74) = 13.12, p,.001, gp
2 = .262, with a priori follow-up tests
showing participants responding significantly faster to their own
name than to a friend’s name, t(37) = 4.25, p,.05, d= .480, or a
stranger’s name, t(37) = 3.29, p,.05, d= .372. RT in response to
friend and stranger names did not differ, t(37) = 1.99, ns, d= .108.
(see Figure 5).
There was no main effect of Distractor Face, F(2,74) = 1.71, ns.,
gp
2 = .044, but this null effect is qualified by a significant
interaction between Distractor Face and Target Name,
F(4,148) = 3.95, p,.005, gp
2 = .096. Follow-up tests show that
type of Distractor Face did not have any effect when responding to
the self-name or a friend’s name, but when responding to a
stranger’s name the presence of a friend’s face significantly
increased RT relative to both the stranger’s face, t(37) = 3.12, p,
.017, d= .175, and the self-face, t(37) = 2.71, p,.017, d= .135,
suggesting that a peripherally presented friend’s face causes more
distraction when processing a stranger’s name than either the self-
face or a stranger’s face. There was no difference in effect when
responding to a stranger’s name in the presence of the self-face or
stranger’s face, t(37) = 1.06, ns, d= .044. Alpha is Bonferroni
corrected to.017 for three comparisons. See Figure 6 for
illustration of the interaction effects.
There was no effect of Visual Field, F(2,74) = 0.67, ns.,
gp
2 = .018, nor did Visual Field interact with any of the other
variables (Visual Field by Target Name by Distractor Face:
F(8,296) = 0.63, ns., gp
2 = .017; Visual Field by Target Name:
Figure 4. Example of a bilateral stimulus from Experiment 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110792.g004
Figure 5. Response times to the self-name, friend’s name and stranger’s name in Experiment 2. Mean response times to recognise the
self-name (red) a friend’s name (blue) and a stranger’s name (green) in Experiment 2.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110792.g005
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F(4,148) = 0.29, ns., gp
2 = .008; Visual Field by Distractor Face:
F(4,148) = 1.09, ns., gp
2 = .029).
Accuracy Analyses. As expected, there was a ceiling effect
for accuracy, with participants correctly identifying whether a
name was their own, a friend’s or a stranger’s at an accuracy rate
of 97.18% (SD = 1.82). There were no significant effects for
accuracy in Experiment 2.
Cross-Experimental Analyses between Experiments 1 and 2
Examining the data suggested that responses to names were
faster in Experiment 2 (when distractor faces were presented
peripherally) compared to Experiment 1 (when distractor faces
were presented centrally). In order to examine whether the robust
self-name RT advantage observed in both experiments differed
depending on whether distractor faces were presented centrally or
peripherally, additional cross-experimental analyses were carried
out, with factors of Experiment (1, 2), Target Name (self, friend,
stranger) and Distractor Face (self, friend, stranger).
There was a significant effect of Experiment, with participants
responding significantly faster to all types of name in Experiment 2
(distractor presented outside the focus of attention; 723.34 ms,
SE = 24.64) compared with Experiment 1 (distractor presented
inside the focus of attention; 811.91, SE = 26.05), F(1, 70) = 6.10,
p,.05, gp
2 = .080. This suggests a greater interference effect of all
types of distractor faces on all types of name when distractors were
presented centrally rather than peripherally.
There was no significant interaction effect between Target
Name and Experiment or Distractor Face and Experiment,
suggesting similar self-name RT advantages across both experi-
ments, regardless of where distractor faces were presented. A
significant Target Name by Distractor Face by Experiment
interaction mirrored what findings from Experiments 1 and 2
showed separately – for Experiment 1, congruent face-name
stimuli pairings elicited faster naming responses than incongruent
pairings for both Self and Friend pairings, but not for Stranger
pairings and for Experiment 2, congruence did not facilitate
naming but rather a friend’s face provided more distraction than
either the self-face or a stranger’s face when responding to a
stranger’s name.
Discussion
Across two studies, we found that participants responded
significantly faster to their own name than to other names. The
self-face did not cause more distraction than other faces either
when presented centrally or peripherally, suggesting that our own
face does not selectively grab our attention when either inside or
outside the focus of attention. Instead, we report a facilitation
effect of familiar faces on congruent familiar name recognition
when those faces are inside the focus of attention, and an
interesting distraction effect when friend faces are presented
outside the focus of attention.
Self-name processing
A strong finding across both studies was that participants
responded significantly faster to their own name than to a friend’s
or stranger’s name. This finding opposes Bre´dart and Devue’s [26]
report that the self-name and a classmate’s name were identified
equally quickly. One possible reason for this discrepancy is that
our task was simpler – in the current experiments the participants
simply had to identify the name presented, whereas in Bre´dart and
Devue’s study [26] the name to be identified was presented in
tandem with a letter string. Indeed, when others have used a
simple identity decision task, they also report that the self-name
elicits faster responses than other familiar names [40]. We
Figure 6. Influence of peripherally presented task-irrelevant distractor faces on speed of name recognition. Mean response times to
recognise the self-name, a friend’s name and a stranger’s name in the peripherally presented presence of the self-face (red line), a friend’s face (blue
line) and a stranger’s face (green line).
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0110792.g006
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interpret our finding as a straightforward self-referential effect,
with speeded processing for the self-name due to its importance as
a self-referential stimulus. In this way, our finding mirrors previous
reports of speeded self-face processing relative to other faces (e.g.,
[1–3]).
Our own face does not grab our attention
Importantly, the self-face did not cause any more distraction
than either a friend’s face or a stranger’s face, either when
presented inside (Experiment 1) or outside (Experiment 2) the
focus of attention. We conclude from this that our own face does
not automatically or selectively capture our attention. Devue and
Bre´dart [14] argue that the self-face is a better example of a self-
referential stimulus than the self-name, as the self-name can be
shared with others, whereas the self-face is truly unique to the self.
However, the self-name is often used to capture our attention in a
real-world setting (i.e. someone may call you by your name to
attract your attention), making us particularly sensitive to its
presence. The self-face – though an important self-referential
stimulus – is not normally used to capture our attention in this
way. The self-face may be processed as ‘‘special’’ in several ways –
as demonstrated by speeded processing [1–3] and a more bilateral
neural representation compared to other faces [15–20] – but it
does not appear to have special attention capturing properties.
The speeded processing afforded to self-referential stimuli and
observed here and elsewhere does not appear to be driven by
automatic attention capture.
The findings outlined in this paper are important to theories of
self-referential processing because they suggest that not all self-
referential stimuli are equal. While it is established that the self-
name automatically and selectively captures attention [9–12], our
findings show that this is not the case for the self-face. Different
types of self-referential stimuli (name, face) may well serve different
purposes, particularly in terms of capturing attention. It is both
important and interesting to contrast ways in which various types
of self-referential stimuli interact with attentional mechanisms and
processing speeds. Our findings suggest that in the field of self-
referential processing, more focus should be placed on types of self-
referential stimuli and examining the different purposes preferen-
tial processing of these stimuli could serve.
Inside the focus of attention
When presented inside the focus of attention (Experiment 1),
task-irrelevant self-face stimuli did not cause more distraction than
other types of face. Our findings somewhat contradict Gronau and
colleagues [12] in this respect, who showed that centrally
presented task-irrelevant self-referential stimuli (the self-name)
caused more distraction than other names. In our study, the
centrally presented self-faces (and friend’s faces) had a very
different effect on naming speeds – these highly familiar faces
facilitated processing of their associated names. That is, responses
to the self-name were faster in the presence of the self-face and
responses to a friend’s name were faster in the presence of the
friend’s face. This suggests that the task-irrelevant faces were being
processed; they just did not capture attention in a selective way.
Indeed, rather than cause distraction, under certain conditions
congruent faces facilitated name recognition. Importantly, both
the self-face and a friend’s face facilitated the processing of their
associated names when presented inside the focus of attention,
while this was not true for unfamiliar faces. This suggests that the
facilitation effect of face presentation on name recognition may
occur for all highly familiar faces, and is not self-specific. Tong and
Nakayama [1] propose that we develop particularly efficient
processing skills for highly familiar, robustly represented faces, and
we consider the facilitated processing for congruent familiar face-
name pairs reported here to be evidence of this.
Outside the focus of attention
When faces were presented outside the focus of attention
(Experiment 2), an interesting phenomenon emerged. The self-
face did not selectively grab attention, as previously reported [26].
Instead, a friend’s face selectively captured attention – as
demonstrated by significantly increased reaction time to recognise
a stranger’s name in the presence of a friend’s face. We interpret
this as a ‘‘social importance’’ effect. In a real-world setting, it
would be sensible to be primed to pick out familiar friends’ faces
outside the focus of attention – for example, in a crowd. This
would not be the case for our own face, or a stranger’s face. That a
friend’s face only caused distraction when processing a stranger’s
name (and not the self-name or a friend’s name) supports this
interpretation. Both the self-name and a friend’s name are socially
interesting stimuli to us, and so we invest our attention in them.
However, a stranger’s name is not an interesting social stimulus,
and so our attention can more easily be captured by a socially
relevant stimulus – a friend’s face.
With several studies – including our own – now demonstrating
that the self-face is not more attention-grabbing than other types of
face, observing a friend face attention-grabbing effect at peripheral
presentation is not wholly surprising. However, cautious interpre-
tation is warranted here as this effect was not predicted in our
initial hypotheses. Our interpretation of a ‘‘social importance’’
effect is tentative and warrants a further programme of study,
perhaps varying the degree of social importance of the distractor
face.
Facilitation versus distraction effects
We report facilitation effects for familiar faces in Experiment 1,
when distractor faces were presented inside the focus of attention,
but a selective distraction effect for friend faces in Experiment 2,
with distractor faces presented outside the focus of attention. We
posit that this difference is based on cognitive capacity, which
might vary based on the focus of attention.
When distractor faces are presented centrally behind target
names, it is likely that there is sufficient capacity to process the
distractor faces as well as responding to the target name. Indeed,
all types of face (self, friend, stranger) presented inside the focus of
attention automatically and non-selectively grabbed attention.
This is evidenced by significantly slower response times in the
name identification task in in Experiment 1 compared to
Experiment 2, where faces were presented outside the focus of
attention, and suggests that the presence of faces in general
interferes with name identification when those faces are presented
inside the focus of attention. That all types of face (self, friend,
stranger) capture attention when presented centrally makes the
observed differential facilitation effects possible. If we have
sufficient cognitive capacity to attend to distractor faces presented
inside the focus of attention, the simultaneous presentation of two
congruent identity cues – face and name – should lead to speeded
processing of the target stimulus. Indeed, this is what was observed
in Experiment 1, for robustly represented familiar faces.
Conversely, when distractor faces are presented outside the
focus of attention, cognitive capacity during the name identifica-
tion task may not stretch to easily processing the faces while
responding to the target names. In this case, it seems that not all
faces have the capacity to grab attention – only a friend’s face
captured attention, and then only when responding to a socially
unimportant stimulus (a stranger’s name).
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Orientation result
Surprisingly, the orientation of a task-irrelevant face did not
have any effect on its ability to facilitate name recognition for
robustly represented faces (Experiment 1). This may be because
robustly represented faces (self and friend) should contain some
view-invariant information [1], allowing them to convey informa-
tion in both upright and inverted orientations. We were expecting
inversion to affect self-face processing to a lesser degree than other
familiar face processing [3,23], as self-face processing may be less
dependent on configural processing than other familiar face
processing [3,21–23]. However, while inversion may affect self-
face and other familiar face processing differentially in tasks where
the face is attended and task-relevant, it appears that a robustly
represented task-irrelevant face’s ability to facilitate naming is not
affected by inversion. This suggests that whatever information is
driving the facilitation effect is not tied to configural processing.
Hemispheric presentation
Similarly, we observed no main effect of hemispheric presen-
tation on the ability of faces to capture attention (Experiment 2).
This finding is surprising, considering the dominance of the RH in
processing faces (e.g., [33]), but it does support a previous report
that the visual field presentation of faces did not affect attention
capture [26]. Considering the known hemispheric effects involved
in face processing in general and self-face processing in particular,
we conclude that task-irrelevant faces presented outside of the
focus of attention do not recruit the same processing resources as
the task relevant face usually used in studies of hemispheric
asymmetry. In this instance, processing the task-irrelevant
peripherally presented faces may have been too secondary to the
central attentional task for normal hemispheric advantages to be
observed. Additionally, the necessity to present the distractor
images peripherally led us to choose a large angular distance of
9.32 degrees. While traditional hemispheric effects for face
processing can be observed at this angular distance [3], it exceeds
the angular distance used in many hemispheric asymmetry studies,
and may have lessened any effects of hemispheric presentation.
Further study varying angular distance would be useful in
informing as to when faces in general can be more fully processed
(providing a facilitation effect) versus when faces can selectively
provide a distraction.
Conclusion
We conclude that speed of processing advantages commonly
observed for self-faces [1–3] are not driven by automatic attention
capture. In two experiments, we demonstrate no distracting effect
of the self-face in a name recognition task. Instead, we
demonstrate a facilitation effect whereby robustly represented
faces (self, friend) speed the processing of familiar names (self and
friend, respectively; Experiment 1). This is not true for unfamiliar
faces, which do not have robust neural representation. Thus it
appears that face-name facilitation is only possible after a robust
facial representation has developed. When faces are presented
outside of the focus of attention, facilitation no longer occurs.
Instead, we observe a significant attention grabbing effect of
familiar friend faces when processing strangers’ names (Experi-
ment 2). We interpret this as a ‘‘social importance’’ effect, whereby
we may be tuned to pick out and pay attention to familiar friend
faces in a crowd. Finally, across both experiments the self-name
was processed faster than other names, indicating the importance
of this self-referential stimulus. It is unlikely that speed of
processing advantages for self-face stimuli are tied to their
attention-grabbing properties. We propose that any ‘‘special’’
status the self-face holds in the brain may instead be ascribed to a
functional uniqueness in terms of how the self-face is processed
once attended.
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